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SPHERICAL PREFERENCES
CHRISTOPHER P. CHAMBERS AND FEDERICO ECHENIQUE
Abstract. We introduce and study the property of orthogonal inde-
pendence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are
orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal
change over another should be preferred after each marginal change has
been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both.
We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence
if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with
the same center, with preference being “monotone” moving away from
the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special
(limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and polit-
ical environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models
of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and ex-
pected utility in models of choice under uncertainty. As an extension,
we consider an endogenous notion of orthogonality.
1. Introduction
We introduce and study the property of orthogonal additivity, or orthog-
onal independence, in choice theory, and find that it characterizes a class of
preferences with spherical indifference curves. Imagine an agent choosing
among consumption bundles: vectors in Rn. The vectors can be interpreted
in different ways to capture various economic environments. The property
says, loosely speaking, that an agent who prefers to move her consumption
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in direction x to moving her consumption in direction y must preserve this
preference when x and y are both shifted in an orthogonal direction.
Our orthogonal independence property, or axiom, is simple to state, and
uses ideas familiar to any student of economics. Suppose an agent starts
from an endowment, or status quo point, of w. An agent is choosing to either
shift her consumption from w to w+x, or from w to w+y. The axiom, which
we term Origin-independent orthogonal additivity (OIOI) says that
w + x  w + y and z ⊥ x, y =⇒ w + (x+ z)  w + (y + z).
The direction z is orthogonal to both x and y. In a sense, it both comple-
ments and substitutes x and y equally. The axiom says that the comparison
of x and y should not be affected by the addition of the orthogonal direc-
tion z. The axiom is required to hold for every w, x, y, and z satisfying the
hypotheses.
Our main result is that OIOI has strong implications, though much
weaker than the analogous unqualified version of independence would have.
Together with continuity, OIOI implies spherical preferences : prefer-
ences with linear or spherical indifference curves. If the preference has
spherical indifference curves, each sphere must have the same center, and
the preference must be monotone along any ray emanating from that center.
Examples of spherical preferences include perfect substitutes in consump-
tion theory, expected utility in choice under uncertainty, and Euclidean
preferences in voting theory.
We now outline several different economic environments where either
OIOI has a natural meaning, or the spherical representation has particular
interest.
• Net trades. A consumer chooses among consumption bundles x ∈
Rn, which can be thought of as net trades as they involve negative
quantities. Orthogonality has an intuitive geometric meaning.
• Spatial choice. A voter chooses among policy proposals. There
are n issues in question, and each policy proposal takes a stand on
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each issue, so that proposals can be represented as vectors in Rn.
Spherical preferences are closely related to Euclidean preferences,
which have received a lot of attention in the literature on voting
(Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963). In fact, Euclidean preferences are the
special case of spherical preferences where there is an “ideal point,”
and the individual is worse off the further away from the idea point.
• Choice under uncertainty. An agent chooses among uncertain mon-
etary payoffs (monetary acts). There are n states of the world and
each vector x ∈ Rn represents a stage-contingent payoff. When x,
y, and z are non-negative, then z ⊥ x and z ⊥ y means that z
complements x and y in the same states. Thus z’s relation to the
uncertainty inherent in x is the same as its relation to the uncer-
tainty inherent in y, and we may infer that z is as good as hedge
for x as for y. In terms of the representation, monotone spherical
preferences coincide with (risk neutral) subjective expected utility.
• Social choice. Consider a society of n agents, and interpret vectors
in Rn as reflecting the level of welfare of each individual agent.
Linear preferences embody a form of utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1955),
and more general spherical preferences have been studied by several
authors (Epstein and Segal, 1992).
• Dispersion. Consider a finite set of states of the world, with a uni-
form probability measure over them. The set of vectors which sum
to zero are now mean-zero random variables—or monetary acts, and
they form a well-defined finite-dimensional vector space. Since all
acts have mean zero, we can interpret a ranking as a measure or
riskiness or dispersion. Orthogonality now becomes the statement
that two random variables are uncorrelated. So the axiom then re-
quires that the addition of an act which is uncorrelated with each of
two additionally present acts will not reverse their ranking. In this
environment, our axiom becomes related to Pomatto et al. (2019)
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and Mu et al. (2019), except that we explore the stronger condition
of zero correlation rather than statistical independence.
A key property here is that OIOI is a universal property: it claims a
relationship to hold for all collections satisfying certain hypotheses. As
such, and according to Chambers et al. (2014), it is falsifiable. On the
other hand, the model described by the axiom is apparently existential,
relying on the existence of a sphere’s center, or a linear direction.
An extension of our work (see Section 2.3) establishes how one might
endogenize an orthogonality operator. A more general notion of orthogo-
nality would permit more general quadratic transformations. For example,
instead of x · x = 0, we could ask whether x · Ax = 0 holds for some sym-
metric A. In Section 2.3, we do exactly this. Observe that A need not
be positive semidefinite, so “orthogonality” could be of a hyperbolic form.
Importanly, the notion of orthogonality is derived from a utility function,
so that orthogonality is obtained as instances where a conditional linearity
property, like OIOI, holds.
Final results establish that the set of preferences satisfying OIOI is home-
omorphic to a sphere (with the topology of closed convergence), and a finite
test for preferences satisfying our property.
1.1. Related literature. Many authors have studied Euclidean prefer-
ences and quadratic utility. We give a very brief overview of the literature,
but it is fair to say that our result is quite different from the existing work.
Bogomolnaia and Laslier (2007) consider a profile of preferences over a finite
set of alternatives, and study numbers n for which these can be embedded
into Rn so that preferences are Euclidean. Eguia (2011) and Eguia (2013)
also studies the embedding problem, and considers expected utility pref-
erences where the von-Neumann Morgenstern function has the Euclidean
form for the chosen embedding. Azrieli (2011) considers Euclidean pref-
erences when there is a valence dimension and considers families of voters
indexed by their ideal point. Knoblauch (2010) and Peters (2017) study
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the algorithmic problem of recognizing whether preferences are Euclidean.
Degan and Merlo (2009) looks at the empirical implications of Euclidean
preferences for voter data. Henry and Mourifie´ (2013) follows up on the
paper by Degan and Merlo by providing a formal statistical test, and an
identification strategy for Euclidean preferences.
General polynomial (expected) utility was studied by
Mu¨ller and Machina (1987), who connects an m-order polynomial to
preferences that only care about the first m moments of the relevant
uncertain act. In the social choice context, quadratic utility was introduced
in a generalization of Harsanyi’s theory of utilitarian aggregation by
Epstein and Segal (1992), who consider a sort of betweenness axiom.
2. Model and main result
2.1. Model and notation. The objects of choice, or alternatives are
vectors in Rn. The inner product between two vectors is denoted by x · y =∑n
i=1 xiyi. Two alternatives x and y are orthogonal (or perpendicular)
if x · y = 0. In this case we write x ⊥ y. The norm of a vector x is defined
as, and denoted by, ‖x‖ = √x · x.
Choice behavior is modeled through a binary relation  on Rn, which
dictates choice among pairs of alternatives in Rn.
2.2. Axioms and main result. Suppose that w ∈ Rn is given as a start-
ing, or endowment, point, and consider two alternative marginal changes x
and y from w. Ultimately, the choice is between w + x and w + y. Sup-
pose further that w + x is deemed at least as good as w + y; we ask what
happens when an additional marginal change z, orthogonal to both x and
y is additionally appended. Our axiom requires that w + x+ z be at least
as good as w + y + z. In other words, the ranking of the two marginal
changes should not be affected when we shift those changes in an orthogo-
nal direction. Since it imposes additivity, our axiom is similar in spirit to
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the independence axiom of von Neumann-Morgenstern, but it restricts the
set of marginal changes to be those qualified by orthogonality.
Origin independent orthogonal independence (OIOI): For all
w, x, y, z ∈ Rn, if z ⊥ x and z ⊥ y, then w+x  w+y iff w+x+z  w+y+z.
The other two axioms are standard.
Continuity: For all x ∈ Rn, the sets {y ∈ Rn : y  x} and {y ∈ Rn :
x  y} are closed.
Weak order:  is complete and transitive.1
Our main theorem says that continuous weak orders satisfy OIOI if and
only if they can be represented by one of three classes of utility functions.
Theorem 1. Suppose that n ≥ 3. Then a preference  satisfies OIOI,
continuity, and weak order if and only if one of the following is true:
(1) There is u ∈ Rn for which x  y iff u · x ≥ u · y
(2) There is x∗ ∈ Rn for which x  y iff ‖x− x∗‖ ≤ ‖y − x∗‖
(3) There is x∗ ∈ Rn for which x  y iff ‖x− x∗‖ ≥ ‖y − x∗‖.
Remark. We may replace OIOI by an axiom requiring that for any x, y ∈
Rn and any d ⊥ (x− y), x  y iff x+ d  y + d. In fact, this is the axiom
we utilize in our proof.
Thus, OIOI essentially requires that a preference take one of these three
forms. The first representation, in (1) of Theorem 1, is a standard linear
preference. In fact, we have as a simple consequence of the theorem that:
Corollary 2. Suppose that n ≥ 3 and that a preference  satisfies OIOI,
continuity, and weak order, and that there is z ∈ Rn such that for all
x ∈ Rn, x+ z  x. Then there is u ∈ Rn for which x  y iff u · x ≥ u · y.
1Complete: For every x, y ∈ Rn, x  y or y  x. Transitive: For all x, y, z ∈ Rn, x  y
and y  z implies x  z.
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In particular, if  satisfies a standard monotonicity axiom (x  y when-
ever x ≥ y), then OIOI and continuity implies the existence of a linear
representation. Actually, the condition in Corollary 2 can be significantly
weakened. It is enough to postulate that there is no point that is either a
strict local maximum, or a strict local minimum. Other sufficient additional
conditions for linearity can similarly be based off of the non-compactness
of weak lower and upper contour sets.
The second representation, statement (2) of Theorem 1, implies that
preferences are Euclidean: there is an ideal point x∗, whereby preference
is maximized. All other points (consumption bundles, or acts) are compared
with respect to the distance to the ideal point. The further away is a point,
the worse it is. As discussed in the introduction, Euclidean preferences are
heavily used in spatial models in political science, but they have applications
elsewhere as well. The next result says that if we add a property of “strict
convexity,” then our axioms pin down Euclidean preferences.
Corollary 3. Suppose that n ≥ 3 and that a preference  satisfies OIOI,
continuity, and weak order, and that x  y and x 6= y implies that (1/2)x+
(1/2)y ≻ y. Then there is x∗ ∈ Rn for which x  y iff ‖x− x∗‖ ≤ ‖y− x∗‖
The axiom of strict convexity is well known and used in many areas of
economics.
The last possibility in statement (3) is a kind of dual to the Euclidean
idea. Instead of an ideal point, there is a worst point x∗. The further away
from the worst point, the better. This is a model which might explain
“NIMBY” style-preferences.
We term these preferences spherical because they have spherical indif-
ference curves, where we understand the linear preferences in (1) as spherical
because a line is like a limit of spheres with larger and larger radii. Corol-
lary 2 says that linear preferences are the only spherical preferences that
satisfy a basic monotonicity axiom. Corollary 3 makes the obvious point
that the only strictly convex spherical preference is Euclidean.
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2.3. A cardinal approach: endogenous orthogonality. One drawback
of the previous approach is that it can be hard to ascribe meaning to the
notion of orthogonal vectors. One may instead want orthogonality to be
an endogenous condition that triggers additivity. Here we turn to a cardi-
nal version of our exercise where we start from a utility, or social welfare
function, as the primitive object. This primitive is harder to justify and
reason about than the ordinal approach in our main theorem, but it has
the advantage that we do not need an exogenous notion of orthogonality.
Instead, orthogonality will be endogenous.
To fix ideas, think of a social choice framework. Consider a society of
n individuals that chooses among vectors that represent individual agents’
welfare. Let U : Rn → R be a social welfare function.
Our main axiom asks us to think of outcomes w+x obtained by starting
from a status quo w, and modifies it in the direction of x. Then we can
use U to evaluate a change in the direction of x, or a change in the opposite
direction, −x. The axiom requires that this evaluation has to be the same
regardless of the status quo.
Status quo independence:
1
2
[U(w + x)− U(w)] + 1
2
[U(w − x)− U(w)]
is independent of (or constant in) w.
Status quo independence says that a lottery that “shorts” and “longs” x
with equal probability has cardinal gain that is independent of the status
quo w.
Eventual linearity: For any x and y there is w such that
U(w+(x+y))−U(w−(x+y)) = U(w+x)−U(w−x)+U(w+y)−U(w−y)
This means that U acts linearly on x and y for some status quo.
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Theorem 4. Let U be continuous and satisfy U(0) = 0. Then U satisfies
status quo independence and eventual linearity iff U = f + g, where f is
quadratic and g is linear. Moreover, f and g are uniquely identified from
U .
That f is quadratic means that there is a symmetric and bilinear function
S such that f(x) = S(x, x). Observe that, as a consequence, we obtain an
endogenous notion of orthogonality. We say that x and z are U -orthogonal
whenever S(x, z) = S(z, x) = 0. As a special case we have the conventional
definition of orthogonality used in OIOI, with S(x, z) = x · z.
This means that if x and z and U -orthogonal, then U(x + z) = S(x +
z, x+ z)+ g(x+ z) = S(x, x+ z)+S(z, x+ z)+ g(x)+ g(z) = U(x)+U(y).
Thus U satisfies a conditional linearity property, in the same spirit as OIOI.
Linearity is conditional on U -orthogonality. For any x and y, if z is U -
orthogonal to both x and y, then U(x)− U(y) = U(x+ z)− U(y + z).
2.4. Discussion. Theorem 1 relies on a functional equation (the orthogo-
nal Cauchy equation), which is a restricted type of additivity. Axioms of this
type are relatively common in decision theory. Perhaps most closely related
to our notion is the notion of comonotonic additivity, due to Schmeidler
(1986) (an ordinal counterpart first appears in Schmeidler (1989)). This
axiom states that for x, y ∈ Rn which are comonotone (i.e. for which
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have (xi − xj)(yi − yj) ≥ 0), it follows that
u(x+ y) = u(x) + u(y).
The functional equation we describe can be rewritten as: ‖x + y‖2 =
‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2 implies u(x + y) = u(x) + u(y). We can write comonotonic
additivity similarly. Let x∗ ∈ Rn be any vector for which for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n} with i 6= j, we have xi 6= xj . Let Σ denote the set of permutations
on {1, . . . , n}. Define the function f : Rn → R by f(z) = supσ∈Σ z · (x ◦ σ),
where x ◦ σ is the member of Rn for which (x ◦ σ)i = xσ(i).
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Then, it is easy to see that x and y are comonotonic if and only if
f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y); for example, this follows from the classic re-
arrangement inequality (see Hardy et al. (1952), Theorem 368 on p. 261).
Hence, comonotonic additivity then reads: f(x+ y) = f(x) + f(y) implies
u(x+ y) = u(x) + u(y). Thus, there is a kind of general structure common
to both the orthogonal additivity property and the comonotonic additivity
property.
3. On the topological structure of the set of OIOI
preferences
Consider the set of preferences axiomatized in Theorem 1. We wish here
to claim that forRn, upon removing the preference that is total indifference,
the set of such preferences becomes homeomorphic to Sn ≡ {y ∈ Rn+1 :
‖y‖ = 1}. To do so, we discuss a particular topology, the topology of
closed convergence. This topology is the smallest one for which the set
{(x, y,) : x ≻ y} is open.
Let the set Π denote the set of all preferences axiomatized in Theorem 1,
endowed with the topology of closed convergence. The preference I repre-
sents complete indifference.
An important consequence of the following is that the set of OIOI pref-
erences forms a compact set.
Theorem 5. Π \ {I} is homeomorphic to Sn.
Proof. Observe that each ∈ Π \ {I} has a unique representation via:
u(x) = c(x · x) + d · x,
where (c, d) ∈ Sn, and that this map is one-to-one.
Further observe that Sn is compact, and that the topology of
closed convergence is Hausdorff, compact, metrizable (Corollary 3.81 of
Aliprantis and Border (1999)).
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Finally, we show that the map pi : Sn → Π whereby pi(x, d) is the prefer-
ence represented by c(x · x) + d · x is continuous, and then apply Theorem
2.33 of Aliprantis and Border (1999). Continuity of the map pi follows eas-
ily from Theorem 8 of Border and Segal (1994), using the fact that each
∈ Π is locally strict. 
4. Finite data and testing
Here, we imagine we have two binary relations R and P , each of which are
finite, in the sense that |P |, |R| < +∞. We ask when there is a preference
 of the form described in Theorem 1 for which
(1) If x R y, then x  y
(2) If x P y, then x ≻ y.
In case there is such a , we say that (R,P ) are rationalizable. In the
following, ∆(R ∪ P ) ≡ {δ ∈ RR∪P+ :
∑
(x,y)∈R∪P λ(x, y) = 1}.
The following is a counterpart of Chambers and Echenique (2016), The-
orem 11.11.
Proposition 6. (R,P ) are rationalizable if and only if for any λ ∈ ∆(R∪P )
for which
∑
(x,y)∈P λ(x, y) > 0, we have either
(1)
∑
(x,y)∈R∪P λ(x, y)(x · x) 6=
∑
(x,y)∈R∪P λ(x, y)(y · y)
(2)
∑
(x,y)∈R∪P λ(x, y)x 6=
∑
(x,y)∈R∪P λ(x, y)y.
Proof. Rationalizability is equivalent to the existence of c ∈ R and u ∈ Rn
for which:
x R y → c(x · x− y · y) + u · (x− y) ≥ 0
x P y → c(x · x− y · y) + u · (x− y) > 0.
This is a finite system of linear inequalities, whose consistency is
equivalent to the condition in the statement of the Proposition. See
Chambers and Echenique (2016), Lemma 1.12. 
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5. Intuition behind Theorem 1
We give a simple geometric intuition behind our main theorem. Specifi-
cally, we illustrate how the main force of the axiom implies linear indiffer-
ence curves on spheres. Specifically, for each w there is a vector pw such
that for any sphere S centered at w, if x, y ∈ S, then x ∼ y if and only if
pw · x = pw · y. This is not quite enough to prove the theorem, but it serves
to illustrate some of the forces behind it.2
One piece of notation we shall use is that, for x, y ∈ Rn, l(x, y) = {λx+
(1− λ)y : λ ∈ R} denotes the line passing through x and y.
We shall use a seemingly stronger property than OIOI, namely:
Strong origin independent orthogonal independence (SOIOI):
For all x, y, a, b, w ∈ Rn, if x ⊥ y, a ⊥ b, (w + x)  (w + a) and (w + y) 
(w + b), then (w + x + y)  (w + a + b), with strict preference if either of
the antecedent rankings are strict.
One implication of Theorem 1 is that SOIOI is not actually stronger than
OIOI. For the purpose of the arguments developed in this section, we use
SOIOI because it implies a kind of homotheticity:
Proposition 7. If  satisfies weak order, continuity, SOIOA, and n ≥ 3,
then for any w, x, y ∈ Rn for which ‖x‖ = ‖y‖, and any β > 0, w+x  w+y
iff w + βx  w + βy.
The proof of Proposition 7 is in Section 8.
5.1. The case of n = 2. The first bit of intuition can be seen on the plane,
that is with n = 2. The preference  is a continuous weak order, so it has
a continuous utility representation U . Let S be the sphere with center 0
and radius r > 0 on the plane. Write the sphere in polar coordinates, as
S = {(θ, r) : 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2pi}.
2That said, the actual proof relies on a completely different argument.
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We use addition mod 2pi for angles.
First notice that there must exist two points x = (θx, r) and y = (θy, r)
that are antipodal in the sense that θx = θy + pi, and for which U(x) =
U(y). To see this suppose (without loss of generality) that U(0, r) > U(pi, r)
and consider the function
g(t) = U(t, r)− U(t + pi, r) : [0, pi]→ R.
Then g(0) > 0 > g(pi). Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is
θ ∈ [0, pi] with U(θ, r) = U(θ + pi, r).
Consider the figure:
z
z
w
x
y
x′
y′
We show that indifference curves on w + S are linear. By the previous
argument, there exist x and y, antipodal points on S, with the property
that w + x ∼ w + y. Consider the points x′, y′ that lie on a line parallel to
l(x, y). Then there is z ⊥ l(x, y) for which x′ − z and y′ − z are on l(x, y).
Now, since x′ ⊥ z and y′ ⊥ z, ‖x′−z‖ = ‖y′−z‖. So there is β ∈ R with
x′−z = βx and y′−z = βy. Hence Proposition 7 implies that x′−z ∼ y′−z.
Then by OIOI, x′ ∼ y′.
5.2. n ≥ 3. Consider a sphere S with center w and radius r. Choose x1 and
x2, orthogonal vectors with ‖x1‖ = ‖x2‖ = r. Consider the equator defined
by x1 and x2 on S: the set of points on the linear span of {x1, x2} that have
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norm r. By the argument for n = 2 there exists a pair of antipodal vectors
x and y on the equator such that w + x ∼ w + y.
x1
x2
x
y a
b
z
E
Choose a and b on the equator such that a and b are antipodal, and per-
pendicular to x and y. This is possible because the equator has dimension
2, and x and y are antipodal. Moreover, choose a vector z that is orthogonal
to the span of {x1, x2}. Consider the equator E on S defined by a, b and z.
On E we must have, by the argument for n = 2, two antipodal points x′
and y′ with w + x′ ∼ w + y′. Importantly, x′ and y′ are perpendicular to x
and y. Let E ′ be the equator defined by x and x′. E ′ is two dimensional
and generated by the orthogonal lines l(x, y) and l(x′, y′).
The equator E ′ is represented in the following figure. We shall prove that
all the points on E ′ are indifferent.
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z
z′ z′
z
z
z′
z
z′
w
x
y
x′y′
x′′x′′′
y′′
y′′′
So consider first x′′ and y′′ that lie on a line parallel to l(x, y). By the
argument for n = 2, w + x′′ ∼ w + y′′. Reflect x′′ and y′′ across the
l(x, y) line and consider the points x′′′ and y′′′ on E. Again we obtain that
w + x′′′ ∼ w + y′′′.
Note now that y′′ and y′′′ are the reflection of (respectively) x′′ and x′′′
across the l(x′, y′) line. Then w+ x′ ∼ w+ y′ means that w+ x′′ ∼ w+ x′′′
and w + y′′ ∼ w + y′′′. Hence we obtain that
w + x′′ ∼ w + y′′ ∼ w + y′′′ ∼ w + x′′′.
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This implies that for any point on E, it is indifferent to its antipodal
point. To see this, consider a on the following figure and let a′ be its
antipodal point.
a
a′
b
b′
x
y
θ
θ
Let b be the reflection of a across l(x, y). By the previous argument
w + a ∼ w + b ∼ w + a′. So any point is indifferent to its antipodal point.
Finally consider any two points on the same orthant of E ′: Say a and
b. Let c be the vector 1
2
(a + b), scaled to have norm r. Let c′ be the
antipodal point to c on E, d be perpendicular to c, and d′ be antipodal to
d.
a
b
c
d
d′
c′
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Then w + d ∼ w + d′ as we have shown that antipodal points are indif-
ferent. This implies that w + a ∼ w + b by the same projection argument
as before.
Since a and b were arbitrary on the same orthant, we have that w+ a ∼
w + b for all a, b ∈ E ′.
The previous arguments establish the following:
Proposition 8. For each w and r there is p ∈ Rn such that for x, y ∈
S(w, r), x ∼ y iff p · x = p · y.
Now it is easy to show
Proposition 9. For each w and r there is p ∈ Rn such that, for any r′ ≤ r
and x, y ∈ S(w, r′), x ∼ y iff p · x = p · y.
Proof. Let p be as in the previous claim and r′ ≤ r and β = r′/r. Then
x, y ∈ S(w, r) iff βx, βy ∈ S(w, r′). Then p · x = p · y iff w + x ∼ w + y iff
w + βx ∼ w + βy (an implication of Proposition 7). 
6. Proof of Theorem 1
6.1. Necessity. We demonstrate that the three types of preferences satisfy
OIOI. It is obvious that they are continuous weak orders.
So observe that any preference in the class has a representation as u(x) =
cx · x+ v · x, for some c ∈ R and v ∈ Rn. Then (w + x)  (w + y) implies
that
c(w + x) · (w + x) + v · (w + x) ≥ c(w + y) · (w + y) + v · (w + y).
Add c(w + z) · (w + z) + v · (w + z) to both sides to obtain that
c(2w · w + 2w · (x+ z) + x · x+ z · z) + v · (2w + x+ z)
≥ c(2w · w + 2w · (y + z) + y · y + z · z) + v · (2w + y + z).
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Subtract, from each side, cw · w + v · w, obtaining:
c(w · w + 2w · (x+ z) + x · x+ z · z) + v · (w + x+ z)
≥ c(w · w + 2 · (y + z) + y · y + z · z) + v · (w + y + z).
Simplify and obtain:
c(w+ x+ z) · (w+ x+ z) + v · (w+ x+ z) ≥ c(w+ y+ z) + v · (w+ y + z),
using the fact that x ⊥ z and y ⊥ z (hence x · x+ z · z = (x+ z) · (x+ z)
and y · y + z · z = (y + z) · (y + z)). Therefore, w + x+ z  w + y + z.
6.2. Sufficiency.
Proposition 10. For a weak order satisfying OIOI, if d ⊥ (x − y), then
x  y iff x+ d  y + d.
Proof. Observe that x+(0)  x+(y−x). Further, d ⊥ (0) and d ⊥ (y−x).
So by OIOI, x+(0)+d  x+(y−x)+d, or x+d  y+d, and conversely. 
Say a vector subspace D of Rn is inessential if for any d ∈ D and any
x ∈ Rn, x+ d ∼ x.
Proposition 11. If  satisfies OIOI, weak order, and continuity, then if
it has a nontrivial inessential subspace, it is a linear preference.
Proof. To ease notation, suppose that the nontrivial inessential subspace is
the subspace spanned by (0, . . . , 0, 1).
By definition of inessential, there is a preference ∗ on Rn−1 for which
(x, c)  (y, d) iff x ∗ y. We claim that ∗ is a linear preference, that is,
for any x, y, z ∈ Rn−1, we have x ∗ y iff x+ z ∗ y + z.
Thus, suppose that x ∗ y and let z ∈ Rn−1 be arbitrary. Then for any
a ∈ R, (x, 0)  (y, a). In particular, let a = z · (x − y). Observe that
(z, 1) ⊥ (y−x, a) = (y, a)−(x, 0). Consequently by Proposition 10 we have
(x+ z, 1)  (y + z, a + 1), establishing that x+ z ∗ y + z.
The remainder is now standard. 
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Corollary 12. Suppose that  satisfies OIOI, weak order, and continuity.
Suppose n ≥ 3 and let {f1, . . . , fn} be an orthonormal basis for Rn. For
any a, b ∈ Rn and any subset G ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we have:
∑
i∈G
aifi +
∑
i/∈G
aifi 
∑
i∈G
bifi +
∑
i/∈G
aifi
iff ∑
i∈G
aifi +
∑
i/∈G
bifi 
∑
i∈G
bifi +
∑
i/∈G
bifi.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 10 by taking x =
∑
i∈G aifi +
∑
i/∈G aifi,
y =
∑
i∈G bifi +
∑
i/∈G aifi, and d =
∑
i/∈G(bi − ai)fi. 
For our final step we need some additional notational conventions. For
any subspace T of Rn and any x ∈ Rn, let αT (x) be the orthogonal pro-
jection of x onto T . If T = span{f} for some vector f ∈ Rn, we abuse
notation and write αf (x) as the norm of αspan{f}.
Remark. The final steps establish the following. Let Sn−1 denote the unit
sphere. There is a utility representation u of , and for each f ∈ Sn−1 a
function uf : R→ R, satisfying the following properties:
(1) For any orthonormal basis {f1, . . . , fn}, if x =
∑n
i=1 αfifi, then
u(x) =
∑n
i=1 ufi(αfi).
(2) u(0) = 0.
It is then easy to show that u : Rn → R satisfies the property that if x ⊥ y,
then u(x+ y) = u(x) + u(y).
Remark. The proof proceeds in Lemma 13 and Proposition 14 by estab-
lishing the result for n = 3. Then Proposition 15 extends the result to all
n ≥ 3.
Lemma 13. Suppose that n = 3, and that  is a continuous weak order
satisfying OIOI. Suppose that  has no non-trivial inessential subspaces.
Let {f1, f2, f3} be an orthonormal basis for R3 and suppose that u(z) =∑3
i=1 ufi(αfi(z)) is an additive representation for  for which ufi(0) = 0 for
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each i = 1, 2, 3. If {e2, e3} is any other orthonormal basis for span({f2, f3}),
then there is an additive representation for ,
v(z) = vf1(αf1(z)) + ve2(αe2(z)) + ve3(αe3(z)),
such that
v(z) = u(z) = uf1(αf1(z)) + ve2(αe2(z)) + ve3(αe3(z)),
and ve2(0) = ve3(0) = 0.
Proof. First observe that by Corollary 12 and Debreu (1959), since
{f1, e2, e3} is an orthonormal basis, and there are no non-trivial inessen-
tial subspaces,  has an additive representation v(z) = vf1(αf1(z)) +
ve2(αe2(z)) + ve3(αe3(z)). We shall prove that we can choose this repre-
sentation so that vf1 = uf1, u = v, ve2(0) = 0, and ve3(0) = 0.
Define T ≡ span({e2, e3}) = span({f2, f3}). We have two additive repre-
sentations u, v of :
u(z) = u(αf1(z) + αT (z)) = uf1(αf1(z))
+ [uf2(αf2(αT (z)) + uf3(αf3(αT (z)))]
v(z) = v(αf1(z) + αT (z)) = vf1(αf1(z))
+ [ve2(αe2(αT (z)) + ve3(αe3(αT (z)))].
The pair (span({f1}) × T,) constitutes an additive conjoint measure-
ment structure in the sense of Krantz et al. (1971) (see Chapter 6.2.4).3 By
their Theorem 2, there exists β > 0, and γ, γ′ with uf1 = βvf1 + γ and
uf2 + uf3 = β(ve2 + ve3) + γ
′. So define v′f1 = βvf1 + γ, v
′
e2
= βve2 + θ2
and v′e3 = βve3 + θ3, where θ2 = −βve2(0) and θ3 = −βve2(0). Note that
0 = (uf2 + uf3)(0) = β(ve2 + ve3)(0) + γ
′ implies that γ′ = θ2 + θ3. Hence,
3See also Fishburn (1970), Theorem 5.2 or 5.4
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we obtain that
v′(z) = v′f1(αf1(z)) + v
′
e2
(αe2(z)) + v
′
e3
(αe3(z))
= uf1(αf1(z)) + v
′
e2
(αe2(z)) + v
′
e3
(αe3(z))
= uf1(αf1(z)) + uf2(αf2(z)) + uf3(αf3(z)) = u(z).
while v′f1(0) = v
′
e2
(0) = v′e3(0) = 0. Thus v
′ has the desired properties. 
Proposition 14. Suppose that n = 3, that  is a continuous weak order
satisfying OIOI, and has no non-trivial inessential subspaces. Then there is
a continuous utility representation u : Rn → R for which for any x, y ∈ Rn
with x ⊥ y, we have u(x+ y) = u(x) + u(y).
Proof. We say that x and y are parallel, or collinear, if there is a scalar
λ ∈ R with y = λx.
Let {f1, f2, f3} be a given orthonormal basis of R3. By Corollary 12 and
Debreu (1959), since there are no non-trivial inessential subspaces, there
exists a representation u : Rn → R of  for which u(z) =∑3i=1 ufi(αfi(z)).
Suppose without loss of generality that ufi(0) = 0, as additive representa-
tions are preserved by an additive translation of each component utility.
Now, fix arbitrary x, y ∈ Rn for which x ⊥ y. If either x or y is 0, then
we know that u(x + y) = u(x) + u(y) because u(0) = 0. So lets suppose
that x, y 6= 0. Now, we have three possible cases to consider:
(1) x is parallel to some fi and y is parallel to some fj,
(2) Either x or y is parallel to some fi, and the other one is not parallel
to some fj
(3) Neither x nor y are parallel to any fi.
We shall prove that case 3 reduces to case 2, and that case 2 reduces to
case 1.
Let us first consider case 3. Note span{f2, f3}∩ span{x, f1} is nonempty,
as x is not collinear with f1. So choose e2 ∈ span{f2, f3} ∩ span{x, f1},
scaled so that ‖e2‖ = 1. Let e3 ∈ span{f2, f3} then be a unit vector with
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e3 ⊥ e2. Thus x ∈ span{f1, e2} and {f1, e2, e3} is an orthonormal basis of
R3.
By Lemma 13, there exists ve2 and ve3 such that
u(z) = uf1(αf1(z)) + ve2(αe2(z)) + ve3(αe3(z))
while ve2(0) = 0 and ve3(0) = 0.
Since x ∈ span({f1, e2}) and e3 ⊥ span({f1, e2}), there exists e1 such
that {e1, 1‖x‖x} is an orthonormal basis for span({f1, e2}) and {e1, 1‖x‖x, e3}
is an orthonormal basis for Rn.
By Lemma 13 again, there exists ue1 and u x‖x‖ such that
u(z) = ue1(αe1(z)) + u x‖x‖ (α
x
‖x‖
(z)) + ve3(αe3(z)),
ue1(0) = 0 and u x‖x‖ (0) = 0. We are now in the situation of Case 2, as x is
parallel to x
‖x‖
.
So consider x and y in the configuration of Case 2. In particular suppose
that x is parallel to f2. Since x ⊥ y, y ∈ span({f1, f3}). So there exists a
unit vector w such that span({y, w}) = span({f1, f3}). By Lemma 13 there
exists vw and v y
‖y‖
such that
u(z) = u x
‖x‖
(α x
‖x‖
(z)) + v y
‖y‖
(α y
‖y‖
(z)) + vw(αw(z)),
with u x
‖x‖
(0) = v y
‖y‖
(0) = vw(0) = 0. Thus, we are now in the situation of
Case 1.
So consider x and y in the configuration of Case 1. In particular, suppose
that x is parallel to f1 while y is parallel to f2. Recall that x and y are each
nonzero. Observe that
u(x+ y) = u x
‖x‖
(‖x‖) + u y
‖y‖
(‖y‖) + uf3(0)
=
(
u x
‖x‖
(‖x‖) + u y
‖y‖
(0) + uf3(0)
)
+
(
u x
‖x‖
(0) + u y
‖y‖
(‖y‖) + uf3(0)
)
= u(x) + u(y),
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where the penultimate equality follows from the fact that 0 = u(0) =
u x
‖x‖
(0) + u y
‖y‖
(0) + uz(0). 
Proposition 15. Suppose that n ≥ 3, and that  is a continuous weak
order satisfying OIOI, and has no non-trivial inessential subspaces. Then
there exists v ∈ Rn and a scalar c such that u(x) = c‖x‖2+ v · x is a utility
representation of .
Proof. For n = 3 we have shown that there exists a utility representation
that satisfies u(x+ y) = u(x) + u(y) for any x, y ∈ Rn with x ⊥ y. Then,
by Theorem 1 of Sundaresan (1972), u(x) = cx · x + v · x for some c ∈ R
and v ∈ Rn.
So consider n ≥ 3. By Corollary 12 and Debreu (1959), and since there
are no inessential non-trivial subspaces, there exists a utility representation
U(x) =
∑
i
wi(xi)
of .
By the preceding argument, for any subset {i, j, k} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of car-
dinality 3, the representation restricted to Ri,j,k can be chosen to be of the
form
u{i,j,k}(x{i,j,k}) = c
{i,j,k}(x2i + x
2
j + x
2
k) + v
{i,j,k} · (xi, xj, xk).
Then for any {i, j, k} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality 3 we have two
additive representations on R{i,j,k} : wi(xi) + wj(xj) + wk(xj) and∑
h∈{i,j,k} c
{i,j,k}(x2h) + v
{i,j,k}
h xh. By Theorem 2 in Chapter 6.2.4 of
Krantz et al. (1971), there exists α{i,j,k} and β{i,j,k} > 0 with
β{i,j,k}wh(xh) + α
{i,j,k} = c{i,j,k}(x2h) + v
{i,j,k}
h xh
for all xh. This is true for all xh iff there is β, ch and vh with β
{i,j,k} = β > 0,
c{i,j,k} = c, v
{i,j,k}
h = vh and α
{i,j,k} = 0.4 Hence, βwh(xh) = cx
2
h + vhxh.
4Normalize β{i,j,k} = 1. Then, for k 6= l we have wi(xi)+α{i,j,k} = c{i,j,k}(x2i )+v{i,j,k}i xi
and wi(xi) + α
{i,j,l} = c{i,j,l}(x2i ) + v
{i,j,l}
i xi. Hence, α
{i,j,k} − α{i,j,l} = (c{i,j,k} −
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
7. Proof of Theorem 4
We prove sufficiency. So let U be as in the statement of the theorem. Let
f(x) =
1
2
[U(z + x)− U(z)] + 1
2
[U(z − x)− U(z)]
and define g(x) = U(x)− f(x). The following lemmas show sufficiency.
Lemma 16.
f(x+ y) + f(x− y) = 2f(x) + 2f(y)
Proof.
A = f(x− y)− f(x)− f(y) =1
2
U(q + (x− y)) + 1
2
U(q − (x− y))− U(q)
− 1
2
U(q′ + x)− 1
2
U(q′ − x) + U(q′)
− 1
2
U(q′′ + y)− 1
2
U(q′′ − y) + U(q′′)
=
1
2
U(z + (x− y)) + 1
2
U(z − (x− y))− U(z)
− 1
2
U(z + (x+ y))− 1
2
U(z − (x− y)) + U(z + y)
− 1
2
U(z − (x− y))− 1
2
U(z − (x+ y)) + U(z − x)
Where the first equality is by definition of f , with arbitrary q, q′, q′′ ∈ Rn.
The second uses q = z, q′ = z + y and q′′ = z − x.
c{i,j,l}) + (v
{i,j,k}
i − v{i,j,l}i )xi. This can only hold for all xi ∈ R if α{i,j,k} − α{i,j,l} =
c{i,j,k} − c{i,j,l} = v{i,j,k}i − v{i,j,l}i = 0.
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Then we have that
A = −f(x+ y)− 2U(z) + U(z + y) + U(z − x)
+
1
2
[U(z + (x− y)) + U(z − (x− y))− U(z − (x− y))− U(z − (x− y))]
= −f(x+ y)− 2U(z) + U(z + y) + U(z − x)
+
1
2
[U(z + (x− y))− U(z − (x− y))]
= −f(x+ y) + f(x) + f(y)− 1
2
[U(z + x) + U(z − x) + U(z + y) + U(z − y)]
+U(z + y) + U(z − x) + 1
2
[U(z + (x− y))− U(z − (x− y))]
= −f(x+ y) + f(x) + f(y) + 1
2
[U(z + y) + U(z − x)− U(z + x)− U(z − y)]
+
1
2
[U(z + (x− y))− U(z − (x− y))]
Let y′ = −y. Then by Axiom 2 we can set z such that
U(z−y′)+U(z−x)−U(z+x)−U(z+y′)+U(z+(x+y′))−U(z−(x+y′)) = 0.
Thus
f(x− y)− f(x)− f(y) = A = −f(x+ y) + f(x) + f(y).

The function f is continuous and uniquely identified from U . Then
Lemma 16 and Proposition 4 of Chapter 11 of Acze´l and Dhombres (1989)
implies that there is a unique function S : R2n → R such that S is sym-
metric, bi-linear, and f(x) = S(x, x).
Lemma 17.
g(x+ y) = g(x) + g(y)
26 CHAMBERS AND ECHENIQUE
Proof. We have g(x+ y)− g(x)− g(y) = U(x+ y)−U(x)−U(y)− (f(x+
y)− f(x)− f(y)). Hence, for any choice of z, z′, z′′:
g(x+ y)− g(x)− g(y) =U(x+ y)− U(x)− U(y) + 1
2
[U(z + x− y)− U(z)]
+
1
2
[U(z − x+ y)− U(z)]
− 1
2
[U(z′ + x)− U(z′)]− 1
2
[U(z′ − x)− U(z′)]
− 1
2
[U(z′′ + y)− U(z′′)]− 1
2
[U(z′′ − y)− U(z′′)]
In particular, for z′ = y and z′′ = x, and using that U(0) = 0, we obtain
that
g(x+ y)− g(x)− g(y) =1
2
[U(z + x− y)− U(z)] + 1
2
[U(z − x+ y)− U(z)]
− 1
2
[U(y − x)− U(0)]− 1
2
[U(x− y)− U(0)] = 0,
by the axiom. 
Note that g is continuous because U is continuous. Then 17 implies that
g is a linear function by Corollary 2 of Chapter 4 of Acze´l and Dhombres
(1989).
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For necessity: Status-quo independence is a simple calculation. Eventual
Linearity is established by the following calculation.
U(w + (x+ y))− U(w − (x+ y)) = g(w + (x+ y))− g(w − (x+ y))
+ S(w + (x+ y), w + (x+ y))
− S(w − (x+ y), w − (x+ y))
= 2g(x) + 2g(y) + 2S(w, x+ y) + S(x+ y, x+ y)
+ 2S(w, x+ y)− S(x+ y, x+ y)
= 2g(x) + 2g(y) + 4S(w, x) + 4S(w, y) + S(x, x)
+ 2S(x, y) + S(y, y)
= [g(w) + g(x) + S(w,w) + 2S(w, x) + S(x, x)]
− [g(w) + g(−x) + S(w,w) + 2S(w,−x) + S(−x,−x)]
+ [g(y) + g(w) + S(w,w) + 2S(w, y) + S(y, y)]
− [g(−y) + g(w) + S(w,w)− 2S(w,−y)− S(−y,−y)]
= U(w + x)− U(w − x) + U(w + y)− U(w − y)
8. Proof of Proposition 7
We first establish the result for w = 0, so suppose that ‖x‖ = ‖y‖, where
x  y.
We first establish the result for positive integer β. The proof proceeds by
induction. Let a ∈ Rn for which a ⊥ x and a ⊥ y, further ‖a‖ = ‖x‖ = ‖y‖.
Such a exists because n ≥ 3.
By OIOA, it follows that 2a+x  2a+ y. Further, (x−a) ⊥ (x+a) and
(y−a) ⊥ (y+a). Since a+(x−a)  a+(y−a) and a+(x+a)  a+(y+a),
OIOA implies that a+(x−a)+(x+a)  a+(y−a)+(y+a), or a+2x  a+2y.
By OIOA, if 2y ≻ 2x, we would have a+ 2y ≻ a+ 2x, a contradiction. So,
in fact 2x  2y.
Suppose now that x  y, and that we have shown kx  ky for k ∈ N.
We claim that (k + 1)x  (k + 1)y. By (k + 1)a ⊥ kx, (k + 1)a ⊥ ky and
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OIOA, (k + 1)a + kx  (k + 1)a + ky (or a + (kx+ ka)  a + (ky + ka)).
Moreover, a + (x − a)  a + (y − a). Observe that (kx + ka) ⊥ (x − a)
and (ky+ ka) ⊥ (y− a). Consequently, by OIOA, a+ (x− a) + k(x+ a) 
a + (y − a) + k(y + a), or ka + (k + 1)x  ka + (k + 1)y. Again it must
follow that (k + 1)x  (k + 1)y.
By induction, kx  ky for all k ∈ N with k > 0. Note that the same
argument shows that if x ≻ y then kx ≻ ky.
Now let q > 0 be a rational number, q = k/l with k, l ∈ N. Then it must
hold that qx  qy, as qy ≻ qx would imply that lqy = ky ≻ kx = lqx by
the first step and the fact that ‖qx‖ = ‖qy‖.
Finally, by continuity of  we obtain that βx  βy for all real β > 0.
This proves the result for w = 0.
To see that the result holds for arbitrary w, it is enough to observe that
the ranking x w y iff (x + w)  (y + w) satisfies OIOA and apply the
previous argument.
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